Aims. There is concern that aggressive target pricing in the new Bundled Payment for Care Improvement Advanced (BPCI-A) penalizes high-performing groups that had achieved low costs through prior experience in bundled payments. We hypothesize that this methodology incorporates unsustainable downward trends on Target Prices and will lead to groups opting out of BPCI Advanced in favour of a traditional fee for service. Methods. Using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) data, we compared the Target Price factors for hospitals and physician groups that participated in both BPCI Classic and BPCI Advanced (legacy groups), with groups that only participated in BPCI Advanced (non-legacy). With rebasing of Target Prices in 2020 and opportunity for participants to drop out, we compared retention rates of hospitals and physician groups enrolled at the onset of BPCI Advanced with current enrolment in 2020. Results. At its peak in July 2015, 342 acute care hospitals and physician groups participated in Lower Extremity Joint Replacement (LEJR) in BPCI Classic. At its peak in March 2019, 534 acute care hospitals and physician groups participated in LEJR in BPCI Advanced. In January 2020, only 14.5% of legacy hospitals and physician groups opted to stay in BPCI Advanced for LEJR. Analysis of Target Price factors by legacy hospitals during both programmes demonstrates that participants in BPCI Classic received larger negative adjustments on the Target Price than non-legacy hospitals. Conclusion. BPCI Advanced provides little opportunity for a reduction in cost to offset a reduced Target Price for efficient providers, as made evident by the 85.5% withdrawal rate for BPCI Advanced. Efficient providers in BPCI Advanced are challenged by the programme’s application of trend and efficiency factors that presumes their cost reduction can continue to decline at the same rate as non-efficient providers. It remains to be seen if reverting back to Medicare fee for service will support the same level of care and quality achieved in historical bundled payment programmes. Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2021;103-B(6 Supple A):119–125

Aims

Currently, the US Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) has been testing bundled payments for revision total joint arthroplasty (TJA) through the Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) programme. Under the BPCI, bundled payments for revision TJAs are defined on the basis of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). However, these DRG-based bundled payment models may not be adequate to account appropriately for the varying case-complexity seen in revision TJAs.

Aims. The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of the removal of total knee arthroplasty (TKA) from the Medicare Inpatient Only (IPO) list on our Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative in 2018. Methods. We examined our institutional database to identify all Medicare patients who underwent primary TKA from 2017 to 2018. Hospital inpatient or outpatient status was cross-referenced with Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) claims data. Demographics, comorbidities, and outcomes were compared between patients classified as ‘outpatient’ and ‘inpatient’ TKA. Episode-of-care BPCI costs were then compared from 2017 to 2018. Results. Of the 2,135 primary TKA patients in 2018, 908 (43%) were classified as an outpatient and were excluded from BPCI. Inpatient classified patients had longer mean length of stay (1.9 (SD 1.4) vs 1.4 (SD 1.7) days, p < 0.001) and higher rates of discharge to rehabilitation (17% vs 3%, p < 0.001). Post-acute care costs increased when comparing the BPCI patients from 2017 to 2018, ($5,037 (SD $7,792) vs $5793 (SD $8,311), p = 0.010). The removal of TKA from the IPO list turned a net savings of $53,805 in 2017 into a loss of $219,747 in 2018 for our BPCI programme. Conclusions. Following the removal of TKA from the IPO list, nearly half of the patients at our institution were inappropriately classified as an outpatient. Our target price was increased and our institution realized a substantial loss in 2018 BPCI despite strong quality metrics. CMS should address its negative implications on bundled payment programmes. Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2020;102-B(6 Supple A):19–23

Aims

The aim of this study was to investigate the differences in 30-day outcomes between patients undergoing revision for an infected total hip arthroplasty (THA) compared with an aseptic revision THA.

Modern healthcare contracting is shifting the responsibility for improving quality, enhancing community health and controlling the total cost of care for patient populations from payers to providers. Population-based contracting involves capitated risk taken across an entire population, such that any included services within the contract are paid for by the risk-bearing entity throughout the term of the agreement. Under such contracts, a risk-bearing entity, which may be a provider group, a hospital or another payer, administers the contract and assumes risk for contractually defined services. These contracts can be structured in various ways, from professional fee capitation to full global per member per month diagnosis-based risk. The entity contracting with the payer must have downstream network contracts to provide the care and facilities that it has agreed to provide. Population health is a very powerful model to reduce waste and costs. It requires a deep understanding of the nuances of such contracting and the appropriate infrastructure to manage both networks and risk.

Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2017;99-B:1431–4.

Episodic, or bundled payments, is a concept now familiar to most in the healthcare arena, but the models are often misunderstood. Under a traditional fee-for-service model, each provider bills separately for their services which creates financial incentives to maximise volumes. Under a bundled payment, a single entity, often referred to as a convener (maybe the hospital, the physician group, or a third party) assumes the risk through a payer contract for all services provided within a defined episode of care, and receives a single (bundled) payment for all services provided for that episode. The time frame around the intervention is variable, but defined in advance, as are included and excluded costs. Timing of the actual payment in a bundle may either be before the episode occurs (prospective payment model), or after the end of the episode through a reconciliation (retrospective payment model). In either case, the defined costs over the defined time frame are borne by the convener.

Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2017;99-B:1280–5.