Aims. There is concern that aggressive target pricing in the new Bundled Payment for Care Improvement Advanced (BPCI-A) penalizes high-performing groups that had achieved low costs through prior experience in bundled payments. We hypothesize that this methodology incorporates unsustainable downward trends on Target Prices and will lead to groups opting out of BPCI Advanced in favour of a traditional fee for service. Methods. Using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) data, we compared the Target Price factors for hospitals and physician groups that participated in both BPCI Classic and BPCI Advanced (legacy groups), with groups that only participated in BPCI Advanced (non-legacy). With rebasing of Target Prices in 2020 and opportunity for participants to drop out, we compared retention rates of hospitals and physician groups enrolled at the onset of BPCI Advanced with current enrolment in 2020. Results. At its peak in July 2015, 342 acute care hospitals and physician groups participated in Lower Extremity Joint Replacement (LEJR) in BPCI Classic. At its peak in March 2019, 534 acute care hospitals and physician groups participated in LEJR in BPCI Advanced. In January 2020, only 14.5% of legacy hospitals and physician groups opted to stay in BPCI Advanced for LEJR. Analysis of Target Price factors by legacy hospitals during both programmes demonstrates that participants in BPCI Classic received larger negative adjustments on the Target Price than non-legacy hospitals. Conclusion. BPCI Advanced provides little opportunity for a reduction in cost to offset a reduced Target Price for efficient providers, as made evident by the 85.5% withdrawal rate for BPCI Advanced. Efficient providers in BPCI Advanced are challenged by the programme’s application of trend and efficiency factors that presumes their cost reduction can continue to decline at the same rate as non-efficient providers. It remains to be seen if reverting back to Medicare fee for service will support the same level of care and quality achieved in historical bundled payment programmes. Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2021;103-B(6 Supple A):119–125

Episodic, or bundled payments, is a concept now familiar to most in the healthcare arena, but the models are often misunderstood. Under a traditional fee-for-service model, each provider bills separately for their services which creates financial incentives to maximise volumes. Under a bundled payment, a single entity, often referred to as a convener (maybe the hospital, the physician group, or a third party) assumes the risk through a payer contract for all services provided within a defined episode of care, and receives a single (bundled) payment for all services provided for that episode. The time frame around the intervention is variable, but defined in advance, as are included and excluded costs. Timing of the actual payment in a bundle may either be before the episode occurs (prospective payment model), or after the end of the episode through a reconciliation (retrospective payment model). In either case, the defined costs over the defined time frame are borne by the convener.

Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2017;99-B:1280–5.

Aims

The aim of this study was to investigate the differences in 30-day outcomes between patients undergoing revision for an infected total hip arthroplasty (THA) compared with an aseptic revision THA.

Aims

The aim of this study was to compare the rate of perioperative complications following aseptic revision total hip arthroplasty (THA) in patients aged ≥ 80 years with that in those aged < 80 years, and to identify risk factors for the incidence of serious adverse events in those aged ≥ 80 years using a large validated national database.

Aims. Currently, the US Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) has been testing bundled payments for revision total joint arthroplasty (TJA) through the Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) programme. Under the BPCI, bundled payments for revision TJAs are defined on the basis of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). However, these DRG-based bundled payment models may not be adequate to account appropriately for the varying case-complexity seen in revision TJAs. Methods. The 2008-2014 Medicare 5% Standard Analytical Files (SAF5) were used to identify patients undergoing revision TJA under DRG codes 466, 467, or 468. Generalized linear regression models were built to assess the independent marginal cost-impact of patient, procedural, and geographic characteristics on 90-day costs. Results. A total of 9,263 patients (DRG-466 = 838, DRG-467 = 4,573, and DRG-468 = 3,842) undergoing revision TJA from 2008 to 2014 were included in the study. Undergoing revision for a dislocation (+$1,221), periprosthetic fracture (+$4,454), and prosthetic joint infection (+$5,268) were associated with higher 90-day costs. Among comorbidities, malnutrition (+$10,927), chronic liver disease (+$3,894), congestive heart failure (+$3,292), anaemia (+$3,149), and coagulopathy (+$2,997) had the highest marginal cost-increase. The five US states with the highest 90-day costs were Alaska (+$14,751), Maryland (+$13,343), New York (+$7,428), Nevada (+$6,775), and California (+$6,731). Conclusion. Under the proposed DRG-based bundled payment methodology, surgeons would be reimbursed the same amount of money for revision TJAs, regardless of the indication (periprosthetic fracture, prosthetic joint infection, mechanical loosening) and/or patient complexity. Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2020;102-B(7):959–964